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Introduction
Following the collapse the Soviet Union, the United States emerged victorious from the
Cold War and solidified itself as the global hegemon, bringing peace and stability to the
international order. However, in recent years China has begun to expand its economic, military,
and diplomatic reach to establish itself as a competitor vying for power in the international sphere.
In response, the United States strengthened its role as a hegemon and contained China by
increasing its alliance posture and engaging in economic deterrence strategies. As tensions
between the China, the United States, and its allies rise, the United States must re-evaluate its
containment strategy in East Asia to prevent confrontation and war.
History
Origin of American Alliances
Before delving into the specifics of how the United States ought to approach China, one
must understand the history of the American alliance system in East Asia and the rise of China.
After World War II, the United States began to develop military alliances with other nations,
beginning with the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.1 Following this, the United States
branched out to East Asia, forming alliances with many of the nations there as well.
In 1951, the United States and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which
enforced a pacifist constitution on the Imperial Japan and allowed American troops on Japanese
soil. This was the starting point for the Yoshida Doctrine, stating that Japan would rely on the
United States for its security so that it could focus on rebuilding itself. The alliance’s original
purpose was two-fold: first, to bolster America’s presence in East Asia while fighting the Korean
War and the Cold War; and second, to serve as a check on Japan to ensure it did not become a
revisionist military power again.2
Two years later, in 1953, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense
Treaty, which stood as a bulwark against communist expansion of the Soviet Union into Asia
through North Korea during the Cold War. During the Korean War, South Korean President
Syngman Rhee transferred operational control of the military to the United States to win support
for the war and improve its military capabilities.3 This arrangement continues to this day, as a
permanent American military presence remains in South Korea with an American General Officer
serving as the wartime commanded over all of the military forces in the country.
In August 1951, the United States established an alliance with the Philippines through the
U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. This became one of the first significant treaties the
United States had in the Asia-Pacific and served as the cornerstone of American peace and security
in the region after World War II. The United States military relationship with the Philippines has
expanded throughout the years, as the two nations agreements allowing for the creation of
American military bases on Filipino islands.4
In 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty to
contain communist expansion into the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. Once the United States
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formed its alliance with Taiwan, it enabled a complete network of military alliances between
America and the East Asian nations to ensure democracy in the region. The signing of the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act allowed the United States to continue unofficial relations with Taiwan after
President Jimmy Carter acknowledged the One China principle through maintaining commercial
ties with Taiwan and engaging in substantial arms sales that are still in effect.5
Origin of China’s Rise
In the mid-nineteenth century, Great Britain and France launched two Opium Wars against
China to force it to sell opium after China stopped trading the drug. China lost both wars and was
forced to cede Hong Kong to Great Britain and open ports with other nations, including the United
States. To China, this was an unequal treaty signed as a result of Western aggression, causing
China to view the West, particularly the United States, in a negative light.6 Although the unequal
treaties established free trade policies and benefitted China’s economy, they were instrumental in
building resentment towards Western imperialism.
The Opium Wars were a major contributing factor to the fall of the Chinese imperial
dynasty and the beginning of what is known as the Chinese Century of Humiliation. Before the
Opium Wars, China was considered the world’s most advanced civilization, yet fell behind the
superior technology of the Western nations, which resulted in its military defeat and subsequent
collapse of its economic and political system.7 As a result, China began to isolate itself from other
nations and focused inwardly on improving its domestic problems.
According to the Chinese Communist Party, the Century of Humiliation took place from
1849-1949. Now, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated that his goal is for China to restore itself
to the great Chinese Empire it once was and overtake the United States in the next century. This
strategy has becoming known as the 100 Year Marathon, as China seeks to upend the international
order in the same time it took to lose its spot on the pedestal. Xi promised that China would become
a global leader in its national strength and international influence to build a stable international
order so China’s national rejuvenation could finally be fulfilled.8
Modern-Day China
China has already taken significant advances towards overtaking the United States.
Specifically, China has vastly improved its economy9 and its military capabilities to match that of
the United States,10 and is engaging in cyber activities such as espionage and cyber-attacks to steal
data from the United States and threaten the American cyber infrastructure.11 Additionally, China
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has expanded its international influence by cooperation and trade with other nations through
projects such as the Belt and Road initiative.12
In light of China’s actions, the United States has rightly recognized the legitimate threat of
China to its global hegemony. However, there are conflicting ideas of how the United States should
engage China. Some, such as President Donald Trump, argue America should take a more
aggressive stance toward China and treat it as an adversary to secure international influence. They
have developed a growing list of grievances against China, including Chinese currency
manipulation, cyber threats, and intellectual property theft. As a result, these individuals have
begun to treat China as an outright enemy to preserve the current international order.13
Others, such as President Barack Obama, contend that the United States should pursue
constructive engagement with China to welcome it into the international order. Some brush over
its human rights abusees and aggressive territorial claims to befriend China. However, this paper
proposes that a middle road between these two forms of engagement will result in a more
productive relationship with China.
Benefits of East Asian Alliances
The United States alliance system in East Asia is fundamental in providing peace and
security in the region. During the Cold War, these alliances were essential to combatting
communism from the Soviet Union. Now, their primary function is to guard against a rising China
as it seeks to expand its global influence.14
Benefits of the Japanese Alliance
The Japanese alliance with the United States is one of the cornerstones of American foreign
policy and international relations, as trade and interregional cooperation in Asia greatly benefit
from a strong American presence. However, the most crucial aspect of the alliance is its geographic
location, being close to China, as it allows the United States to maintain extended deterrence in
the area. To Japan, the United States alliance and assurance of protection is key to regional security
and brings Japan safety and security in deterring threats from nearby nuclear-armed nations such
as China and North Korea.15
Benefits of the South Korean Alliance
The United States’ alliance with South Korea is highly important to strategic policy in East
Asia, as South Korea is located close to both China, the United States’ strongest competitor, and
North Korea, an upstart rival. As well. Thus, South Korea’s strong military and defense capabilities
hedge against threats coming at it from multiple directions. Specifically, the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense system, which serves as a vital deterrent against North Korean missile
testing, is also equipped with surveillance capabilities that make it possible for the United States
to keep a watchful eye on both North Korea and China.16
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Benefits of the Filipino Alliance
The Filipino alliance is crucial to the American military presence in East Asia and
combatting an emerging China through securing the freedom of the seas and deterring Chinese
aggression in the South China Sea.17 The Visiting Forces Agreement between the United States
and the Philippines is vital to joint counter-terror operations, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and
military training. Ensuring a solid department for humanitarian resistance allows the Philippines
to serve as a haven during times of environmental calamities that have wrecked the infrastructure
of the Philippines and surrounding nations.18
Benefits of the Taiwanese Alliance
After the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the United States ceased formal alliance operations
with Taiwan yet continued unofficial diplomatic and military ties. The United States pledged to
sell defense weapons to Taiwan and has stated that it regards any coercive moves by China against
Taiwan as a breach of peace in East Asia.19 There is a policy of strategic ambiguity between the
two nations regarding to what degree the United States will support Taiwan. The main reason for
the continued alliance between the United States and Taiwan is to deter Chinese aggression and
demonstrate the United States’ strong military power in the area.20
Benefits of a Cohesive East Asian Alliance Strategy
Each of the United States’ individual alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
and Taiwan are important to stability in the region, but the combination of these alliances is vital
to a cohesive East Asian alliance strategy. Establishing a strong military presence in these countries
allows America to continue to power project in the region and acts as a barrier surrounding China.
It is only with all of the East Asian allies united that America can adequately deter China through
its military presence, strong leadership, and solid strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, if the United
States were to abandon even one of its allies, its deterrence strategy would falter. 21 Although the
South East Asian alliance partners of India, Australia, and Thailand are also needed for complete
encirclement, they are not the main focus of this discussion.
Costs of East Asian Alliances
However, the United States alliance system is not always perfect, as there are many
disagreements and challenges that the nations face when determining how to ensure each
countries’ needs are met. Additionally, as the United States’ strong presence in the area poses a
threat to China, China has taken retaliatory moves such as strong economic sanctions and increased
military presence in response to the allies’ support against China.22 In addition to costs in an
abstract sense, these alliances have also had a substantial monetary toll on the United States. Thus,
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the United States and its allies must also weigh the costs of maintaining the alliances as they
currently exist.
Costs of the Japanese Alliance
Although it provides many benefits, there are several costs to the United States as a result
of the alliance with Japan. There is a substantial amount of American military spending directed
toward Japan, and according to reports, the United States spent almost $20.9 billion on defense
over the past four years, while Japan spent only $12.6 billion.23 Additionally, the United States has
committed to defending Japan in its territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands,
meaning that if confrontation over the islands broke out, America would be roped into the conflict,
which would escalate to nuclear war due to high tensions and offense military postures.24 If Japan
became less dependent on American assistance and improved its Self-Defense Forces, it could
increase domestic deterrence, allow for self-sustainability, and establish Japan as a stronger global
power.25
Costs of the South Korean Alliance
As for South Korea, many problems in its alliance with the United States stem from tension
over burden-sharing costs. The United States spend $13.4 billion to maintain troops in South
Korea, while South Korea spent only $5.8 billion.26 Furthermore, South Korea sees the United
States’ hardline stance on North Korea as the barrier to improving relations on the peninsula. The
United States’ harsh sanctions, adversarial posture, and refusal to formally declare an end to the
Korean War only increase tensions between North and South Korea, who have been seeking
peninsular reunification for decades.27
Costs of the Filipino Alliance
With regard to the Filipino alliance, although American commitments to assurance have
been strong, Filipino guarantees wavered. Since Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte took office in
2016, the Philippines reneged on its agreements with the United States to allow troops and military
exercises on the islands, and even threatened to abrogate the alliance entirely.28 The Philippines
began to distance itself from America and gravitate towards Russia and China, yet in spite of this,
the United States recently increased its commitment to the Philippines, allocating more money to
its military budget and expanding the scope of its treaty to apply to any ships or disputed Filipino
territories, particularly in the South China Sea. This greatly exacerbates the potential for war
between the United States and China to break out, as America pledged to respond militarily to any
conflict that arises between the Philippines and China, who have been operating in each other’s
spheres of influence very frequently as of late.29
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Costs of the Taiwanese Alliance
Concerning the alliance between the United States and Taiwan, the highest costs come
from the potential for conflict over Taiwan and China. Recently, China has been modernizing its
military capabilities and expanding its reach across the Asia-Pacific, while Taiwan has decreased
its investment in defense infrastructure and military readiness.30 With Taiwan falling behind
militarily, any changes in the balance of power between the United States and China only
exacerbates the likelihood that China could take steps to invade Taiwan, which would put to the
test the United States’ defense commitments to Taiwan. Furthermore, the United States has
recently cast aside long-standing policies with China and Taiwan by abruptly lifting government
decrees prohibiting interactions between American and Taiwanese diplomats, which only further
increases the possibility of a conflict erupting between China, Taiwan, and the United States.31
Chinese Containment
Methods of Containment
In the Cold War, the United States introduced a foreign policy strategy known as
containment to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and communism into Europe and Asia.32
Since then, the United States has maintained its position of seeking to quell Chinese influence in
East Asia. In recent American history, presidents have increased American military presence in
the Asia-Pacific, launched trade wars, and implemented sanctions against China to prevent it from
becoming a regional hegemon.33
During the presidency of George H.W. Bush, the American strategy was to prevent China
from rising through military containment with doctrinal policies such as unilateralism, preemption, and missile defense.34 However, this approach was inherently flawed and unsustainable,
as no individual nation can adequately manage global security challenges alone. Following this,
the United States shifted its containment policy to include its East Asian alliances through
President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia.” The main flaw in this strategy was that it signaled to
China that the United States was taking offense actions to contain it militarily. In response to the
aggressive containment policy in East Asia, China began to further modernize its military
deterrence strategy to prepare for a possible conflict between it and the United States.35
After President Donald Trump took office, the containment strategy toward China took a
different nature. The United States began to pursue geo-economic containment through aggressive
economic sanctions to promote American economic growth, which started a trade war against
China. In July 2018, the United States placed a twenty-five percent tax on $34 billion of Chinese
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imports, and China imposed a retaliatory tax of twenty-five percent tax on $34 billion of American
imports. This escalation continued, and the trade war against China shattered global norms and
paved the way for America to continue to pursue more aggressive policies against China.36 As for
President Joe Biden, he has maintained economic sanctions and spoken out against China’s
continued human rights violations, recognizing that the United States is still locked in competition
with China and that removing the economic penalties too soon could legitimize China’s actions.37
Benefits of Containment
Containment of China is beneficial to quell its expansionist desires and prevent it from
overtaking the United States as the global hegemon. If China is to surpass the United States, many
argue China will export its authoritarian and community model to other nations, which would
cause others to align with its model of government and become a front to democracy and
capitalism.38 Through American containment of China, the United States is able to prevent China
from being militaristically expansionist. If the United States were to cede hegemony to China in
East Asia, China could take offensive actions in disputed territories such as the Spratly Islands,
the Senkaku Islands, and Taiwan. China is seeking to increase its influence in the region through
any means necessary, which requires the United States to continue to contain China.39
Costs of Containment
However, the containment strategy that the United States is employing against China is
highly aggressive and has caused several negative effects that can only get worse. The current
containment strategy fuels mistrust and increases tensions in East Asia which amplifies the risk of
unnecessary war.40 Additionally, the monetary costs of containing China in East Asia have been
monumental, as the United States has spent billions on increasing its military operations in the
Asia-Pacific only for its allies to not improve their capabilities.41 Furthermore, the United States’
trade war with China has negatively affected American trade, causing economic growth to slow,
business investment to halt, manufacturing plants to suffer, and farmers to lose business and go
bankrupt.42 China has made it clear that it is unwilling to continue to be contained by the United
States, and maintaining this offense posture would put the two on a collision course.
Analysis
For the United States, one of its biggest challenges is understanding how to approach China
in East Asia. The United States has employed different containment and engagement strategies
throughout the years, and once again, the environment in East Asia has changed. At its disposal,
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the United States has strong alliances, a powerful military, and a cohesive containment strategy.
Thus, the United States must determine how maintaining the status quo, increasing its
commitments, and decreasing its commitments would affect the global balance of power.
Alliance Strategy
Currently, the United States maintains a high degree of influence in East Asia due to its
alliance strategy. If the United States were to maintain its status quo alliance strategy, it would
continue to increase tensions but likely would not cause a war between the United States and
China.43
Some allies, such as Japan and Taiwan, are in favor of increasing the United States’ force
posture in East Asia, as they view it to be necessary to prevent war. However, if the United States
were to do so, this would generate an adverse reaction from China and likely cause it to attack
Taiwan, drawing in the United States as well.44
One the other hand, allies such as South Korea and the Philippines are in favor of
decreasing American alliance commitments to them, as they view it to be unnecessarily
provocative and infringing on their ability to gain influence. If the United States were to cede East
Asia to China, it would result in a hegemonic transition that could likely spark a nuclear war. 45
However, taking a strategic and thoughtful approach through actions such as these would likely
not result in any offensive action from China.46
Geo-Economic Strategy
As for its geo-economic strategy, the United States and China are still engaged in a sort of
trade war, with both sides imposing sanctions on the other over political and ideological
disagreements. President Biden has not removed the tariffs that President Trump placed on China,
and he has begun to take offensive actions against China as well. If the United States were to
remain the status quo in regard to its geo-economic strategy, there would likely not be any drastic
changes to the global balance of power. The sanctions that the United States has placed on China
have not had any substantial effect on the Chinese economy or military, but instead have only
resulted in retaliatory sanctions against the United States.47
However, the United States could also increase its geo-economic competition against
China, which could take either an offensive or a defensive form. A defensive approach would
involve America imposing more sanctions and tariffs on China, yet this would be
counterproductive, as not only would is negatively affect American businesses, but it would cause
China to double down on its aggressive actions.48 An offensive approach would require America
to increase production and create supply chains in key industries such as farming and steel
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manufacturing.49 Thus, a defensive approach is incompatible with an offensive approach, because
the defensive approach negatively impacts the American economy and workers across all sectors
of the market.50 An offensive approach would reinvigorate the economy and have a strong potential
to allow the United States to pull ahead in the economic race with China.
Instead of approaching China as an adversary to combat, the United States could also
attempt to welcome China into the international order and help its economy transition to a fully
capitalist system. As China’s economy is expected to quickly surpass that of every other nation,
including the United States, it would be an uphill battle to attempt to mitigate China’s economy
and trade.51 With this understanding, the United States could pursue a policy of constructive
engagement with China and seek to improve its economic relationship with China.
Recommendations
Alliance Strategy
In regard to its alliance strategy, the United States should continue to maintain its alliances
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, yet some adjustments are necessary to
benefit the United States and its allies, as well as to prevent a war from breaking out with China.
For Japan, the United States should maintain its current force posture but encourage Japan
to increase its Self-Defense Forces and take a more prominent role in the alliance. This would
allow Japan to ensure its defense against China and for the United States to move away from an
outdated strategy of preventing Japanese expansion.52
For South Korea, the United States should decrease the number of troops stationed there
and encourage South Korea to modernize its military capabilities. In doing so, South Korea would
be better able to establish itself as an independent power in the Asia-Pacific and be able to take
charge of its international relations with North Korea as it sees fit.53
For the Philippines, the United States should rescind its commitment to respond militarily
in the event of any conflict between the Philippines and China in disputed territory in the South
China Sea. This policy provokes China to test the United States’ commitment, because it is not
realistic that the United States would launch a war with China if Chinese boats were to come into
contact with Filipino fishing vessels, and thus China would be more incentivized to do so. If the
United States did respond with military action, that would cause unnecessary escalation and death.
If the United States did not respond, China would reveal that American commitments cannot be
trusted and weaken American influence. In solidifying the alliance as something to be believed, it
will prevent China from taking aggressive actions toward the Philippines.54
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For Taiwan, the United States should make explicit its commitment to defend Taiwan in
the event of a Chinese invasion, as establishing a clear guideline with China will deter China from
invading Taiwan because China does not want to get into a full-on war with the United States.
Additionally, China would trust the American commitment to defend Taiwan if the United States
decreased its uncredible commitments and made explicit its commitment to Taiwan. In doing so,
the United States can further deter Chinese aggression and signal its commitment to protecting
democracy and freedom.55
Geo-Economic Strategy
As for its geo-economic strategy, there are several actions that the United States should
take. First, the United States should clarify the sanctions that it is imposing on China and the
justifications for doing so. This would decrease the ambiguity surrounding which sectors of the
economy the United States is targeting, and give China further clarity as to what actions could be
taken to reduce the sanctions.56 Second, the United States should make efforts to improve the
American economy through opening its markets and promoting domestic manufacturing, couples
with economic incentives. In doing so, America would be able to grow its economy and lessen its
reliance on China for trade.57 Third, the United States should work with its allies in Asia to develop
a strong international order and promote fair trade. In cooperating with its allies, the United States
can continue to demonstrate its commitment to these nations and to democracy.58 Through these
actions, the United States can improve its economy and the economy of its allies while being able
to continue to hold China accountable for its actions.
Allied Assurance
In taking these actions, the United States would be able to prevent a war with China and
grow its economy without sacrificing the trust and support of its allies in East Asia. These policies
are specifically tailored to the wants and needs of each ally and demonstrates the confidence and
appreciation that the United States has for its allies. By taking a step back in Japan and South
Korea, the United States will allow those two nations to have a more substantial role in the
formation of their military and increased standing in the international arena. For the Philippines,
the United States will continue to protect the country while adjusting its policy so as to not
unnecessarily cause war. For Taiwan, the United States will end its policy of ambiguity and make
clear that it intends to defend Taiwan. China would not view the United States’ actions in Japan,
South Korea, or the Philippines as aggressive, as the United States is allowing its allies to have a
stronger role in their partnerships. The only action that might cause backlash from China would
be the United States’ declaration to protect Taiwan. However, China is already operating as if the
United States would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an invasion, meaning that the only
thing this policy would do it make explicit to everyone the United States’ intentions.59
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Adversarial Deterrence
However, by no means does this mean that the United States would give up on its overall
deterrence policy against China. The United States is not abandoning any of its allies, and is in
fact recommitting to Taiwan, which is one of the most contentious issues between the United States
and China. Rather, the United States is backing down from its uncredible commitments to make
certain to China what it will protect and what it will not protect. In doing so, the United States will
increase its deterrence and international credibility through only defending what it can and will
actually defend.60 In regard to its geo-economic strategy, the United States is continuing its
containment and deterrence posture against China by maintaining its economic sanctions against
it. This will signal to China that although the United States is not wholly opposed to China joining
the international order, it is still expected to follow international norms such as democracy,
protection of human rights, and freedom of speech.
Furthermore, even if China were to surpass the United States economically, it would not
spell the end of American global hegemony.61 China still faces several struggles, including its
internal political issues as a result of its one-party Communist system, and its geographical issues
through competitions from neighboring countries such as India and Russia. Thus, even with the
United States decreasing some of it alliance commitments to its partners in East Asia, there is no
need for the United States to fear the decline of its influence internationally, as it will still remain
the dominant power.
Conclusion
Throughout the past few decades, China has solidified itself as the United States’ primary
competitor in terms of military, economy, and international influence. In response, the United
States has pursued a policy of containment through anchoring its alliances with Japan, South
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and through imposing economic sanctions on China. Now,
the time has come for the United states to re-evaluate its current posture in East Asia and to
determine how to best prevent war with China. To do so, the United States needs to improve its
alliance strategy and its geo-economic strategy. Concerning its alliances, the United States must
allow its allies to take a stronger role in security their military and security and resolve ambiguity
about what the United States will defend. As for its geo-economic strategy, the United States must
build up its economy and work together with its East Asian allies to create a global economy with
strong international norms to allow China to integrate itself into the current system of power. In
doing so, the United States will be able to assure its allies of its strong commitment to them, deter
China from taking provocative actions in East Asia, and prevent war from occurring.

60
Peter Beinart, “America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age,” The Atlantic,
September 16, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democraticforeign-policy-for-the-trump-age/570010.
61
Ashok Swain, “China’s economy and military can overtake US, but it still won’t become global
superpower,” The Print, January 21, 2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/chinas-can-overtake-us-but-it-still-wontbecome-global-superpower/588718.

Bibliography
Albert, Eleanor. “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance.” Council on Foreign Relations,
October 21, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-philippines-defense-alliance.
Allen, Craig. “U.S.-China trade dispute harms Americans.” Politico, June 24, 2021.
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/06/24/us-china-tradedispute-harms-americans-493351.
Bandow, Doug. “Why the Hawks Are Wrong about China Too.” Cato Institute, November 14,
2019. https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-hawks-are-wrong-about-china-too.
Beinart, Peter. “America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Era.” The
Atlantic, September 16, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shieldof-the-republic-a-democratic-foreign-policy-for-the-trump-age/570010.
Blanchard, Ben. “Timeline: U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 2020 total $5 billion amid China
tensions.” Reuters, December 7, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwansecurity-usa-timeline/timeline-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan-in-2020-total-5-billion-amidchina-tensions-idUSKBN28I0BF.
Botto, Kathryn. “Why Doesn’t South Korea Have Full Control Over Its Military?” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, August 21, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/
2019/08/21/why-doesn-t-south-korea-have-full-control-over-its-military-pub-79702.
Brands, Hal. “What Does China Really Want? To Dominate the World.” Bloomberg, May 20,
2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-20/xi-jinping-makes-clearthat-china-s-goal-is-to-dominate-the-world.
Brunner, Jordan, and Emily Weinstein. “The Strategic and Legal Implications of Biden’s New
China Sanctions.” Lawfare, June 18, 2021. https://www.lawfareblog.com/strategic-andlegal-implications-bidens-new-china-sanctions.
Cabato, Regine, and Shibani Mahtani. “Pompeo promises intervention if Philippines is attacked
in South China Sea amid rising Chinese militarization.” The Washington Post, February
28, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pompeo-promises-intervention-ifphilippines-is-attacked-in-south-china-sea-amid-rising-chinese-militarization/2019/02/28/
5288768a-3b53-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html.
Coy, Peter. “Taiwan Needs to Spend More on Defense, Says a Former Diplomat.” Bloomberg,
April 15, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-15/taiwan-needs-tospend-more-on-defense-says-a-former-diplomat.
Cropsey, Seth, and Jun Isomura. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Significance and Role.” Hudson
Institute, April 2018. https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/
CropseyIsomura.pdf.

Davis, Malcolm. “The US and its allies must ensure Taiwan doesn’t fall to Beijing.” Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, February 11, 2021. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-usand-its-allies-must-ensure-taiwan-doesnt-fall-to-beijing.
DePetris, Daniel R. “Sanction China? Remember, Sanctions Rarely Succeed—And Often
Backfire.” Newsweek, April 17, 2020. https://www.newsweek.com/sanction-chinaremember-sanctions-rarely-succeed-often-backfire-opinion-1498658.
Dollar, David, and Ryan Hass. “Getting the China challenge right.” Brookings Institution,
January 25, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/research/getting-the-china-challenge-right.
Dorfman, Zach. “China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe.”
Foreign Policy, December 21, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/china-stolenus-data-exposed-cia-operatives-spy-networks.
Elegant, Naomi Xu. “China’s 2020 GDP means it will overtake the U.S. as world’s No. 1
economy sooner than expected.” Fortune, January 18, 2021. https://fortune.com/
2021/01/18/chinas-2020-gdp-world-no-1-economy-us.
Fetter, Steve, and Jon Wolfsthal. “No First Use and Credible Deterrence.” Journal for Peace and
Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (April 9, 2018): 102-114.
https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257.
Ford, Lindsey W., and James Goldgeier. “Retooling America’s alliances to manage the China
challenge.” Brookings Institution, January 25, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/
research/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge.
Gale, William G., and Grace Edna. “Economic relief and stimulus: Good progress but more work
to do.” Brookings Institution, December 16, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/
economic-relief-and-stimulus-good-progress-but-more-work-to-do.
Green, Michael J., and Gregory B. Poling. “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines.” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, December 3, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/usalliance-philippines.
Haass, Richard. “A Cold War With China Would Be a Mistake.” The Wall Street Journal, May
7, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-start-a-new-cold-war-with-china11588860761.
Heer, Paul. “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia.” National Interest, January 8, 2019.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972.
Henderson, Ian. “Why the United States Should Encourage a Militarized Japan.” Epoch Times,
November 15, 2018. https://www.theepochtimes.com/why-the-us-should-encourage-amilitarized-japan_2716668.html.

Herscovitch, Benjamin. “A Balanced Threat Assessment of China’s South China Sea Policy.”
Cato Institute, August 28, 2017. http://www.iberchina.org/files/2017/south_china_sea_
cato.pdf.
Hughes, Matthew. “Is the U.S.-Philippines Alliance Obsolete?” National Interest, May 24, 2021.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/us-philippines-alliance-obsolete-185722.
Hunzeker, Michael, and Mark Christopher. “It’s Time to Talk About Taiwan.” Defense One,
February 24, 2020. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/02/its-time-talk-abouttaiwan/163291.
Jalil, Ghazala Yasmin. “China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism.” Institute of Strategic
Studies Islamabad, April 15, 2019. http://issi.org.pk/chinas-rise-offensive-or-defensiverealism.
Keck, Zachary. “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?” The Diplomat, January 24,
2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic.
Klare, Michael T. “Is a War With China Inevitable?” The Nation, July 15, 2021.
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/is-a-war-with-china-inevitable.
Lardy, Nicholas R. “U.S.-China Economic Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Brookings
Institution, April 25, 2001. https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/u-s-china-economicrelations-implications-for-u-s-policy.
Le Corre, Philippe. “On China’s Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, May 9, 2019.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/09/on-china-s-expanding-influence-in-europeand-eurasia-pub-79094.
Liao, Rebecca. “Beware of Chinese Hegemony.” National Interest, December 19, 2014.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/beware-chinese-hegemony-11896.
Lobosco, Katie. “Biden has left Trump’s China tariffs in place. Here’s why.” CNN Politics, last
modified March 25, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/24/politics/china-tariffs-bidenpolicy/index.html.
Logan, Justin. “Rhetoric Aside, America’s Asian Partners Are Giving Up on Their Own
Defense.” The Diplomat, August 5, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/rhetoricaside-americas-asian-partners-are-giving-up-on-their-own-defense.
Losey, Stephen. “Here’s What It Costs to Keep US Troops in Japan and South Korea.”
Military.com, March 23, 2021. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/03/23/hereswhat-it-costs-keep-us-troops-japan-and-south-korea.html.

Morici, Peter. “Opinion: How to win the trade war with China.” Market Watch, September 14,
2019. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-to-win-the-trade-war-with-china-201909-03.
Mullen, Andrew. “US-China trade war timeline: key dates and events since July 2018.” South
China Morning Post, August 29, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/economy/chinaeconomy/article/3146489/us-china-trade-war-timeline-key-dates-and-events-july-2018.
Nephew, Richard. “China and economic sanctions: Where does Washington have leverage?”
Brookings Institution, September 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-andeconomic-sanctions-where-does-washington-have-leverage.
Nepomuceno, Priam. “Humanitarian, disaster ops training a must for PH.” Philippines News
Agency, March 1, 2019. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1063301.
Oh, Daniel. “US-Korea Military Alliance.” Wilson Center, accessed September 7, 2021.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/modern-korean-history-portal/us-koreamilitary-alliance.
Panda, Ankit. “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” The
Diplomat, February 25, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-doesit-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it.
Panton, Michael A. “Politics, Practice and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution.” Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 11, no. 2 (2010): 167-172.
http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_11.2_panton.pdf.
Pillsbury, Michael. The Hundred Year Marathon (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, March 15,
2016). https://thehundredyearmarathon.com.
Rovner, Joshua. “Ambiguity Is a Fact, Not a Policy.” War on the Rocks, July 22, 2021.
https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/ambiguity-is-a-fact-not-a-policy.
Schiavenza, Matt. “How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History.” The Atlantic, October 25,
2013. https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drovemodern-chinese-history/280878.
Sempa, Francis P. “The Case for Containing China.” The Diplomat, June 29, 2019.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/the-case-for-containing-china.
Sen, Ashish Kumar. “It’s Time for the U.S. To Rethink North Korea Policy.” United States
Institute of Peace, September 10, 2020. https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/09/itstime-us-rethink-north-korea-policy.

Shih, Gerry, and Lily Kuo. “Trump upsets decades of U.S. policy on Taiwan, leaving thorny
questions for Biden.” The Washington Post, January 13, 201. https://www.washington
post.com/world/asia_pacific/trump-biden-taiwan-china/2021/01/13/1bbadee0-53c0-11ebacc5-92d2819a1ccb_story.html.
Su, Alice. “Beijing responds to U.S. alliances with ‘wolf warrior’ defiance. Will it backfire?”
Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2021. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/202104-26/china-us-alliances-wolf-warrior-nationalism.
Swaine, Ashok. “China’s economy and military can overtake US, but it still won’t become
global superpower.” The Print, January 21, 2021. https://theprint.in/opinion/chinas-canovertake-us-but-it-still-wont-become-global-superpower/588718.
Tirpak, John A. “US Pays Most of Shared Defense Costs with Japan, South Korea.” Air Force
Magazine, March 17, 2021. https://www.airforcemag.com/u-s-pays-most-of-shareddefense-costs-with-japan-south-korea.
U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Collective Defense Agreements.” Last modified January 20,
2017. https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/index.htm.
U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations With Taiwan.” Last modified August 31, 2018.
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan.
Wax, Gavin. “Let Japan Remilitarize.” Newsweek, May 28, 2020. https://www.newsweek.com/
let-japan-remilitarize-opinion-1506873.
Wilde, Robert. “Containment: America’s Plan for Communism.” ThoughtCo, last modified
October 29, 2018. https://www.thoughtco.com/what-was-containment-1221496.
Williams, Robert D. “What did the US accomplish with its South China Sea legal statement?”
Brookings Institution, July 22, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/
2020/07/22/what-did-the-us-accomplish-with-its-south-china-sea-legal-statement.
Zhang, Ziyu. “U.S.-China Rivalry: who has the stronger military?” South China Morning Post,
July 12, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3140681/us-chinarivalry-who-has-stronger-military.

